GLOBAL WARMING LITIGATION UNDER THE
ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: WHAT SOSA V.
ALVAREZ MACHAIN AND ITS PROGENY
MEAN FOR INDIGENOUS ARCTIC
COMMUNITIES by Kaur, Mini
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 9
Fall 9-1-2006
GLOBAL WARMING LITIGATION UNDER
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: WHAT
SOSA V. ALVAREZ MACHAIN AND ITS
PROGENY MEAN FOR INDIGENOUS
ARCTIC COMMUNITIES
Mini Kaur
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice at Washington & Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an
authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mini Kaur, GLOBAL WARMING LITIGATION UNDER THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: WHAT SOSA V. ALVAREZ MACHAIN
AND ITS PROGENY MEAN FOR INDIGENOUS ARCTIC COMMUNITIES, 13 Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 155 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol13/iss1/9
GLOBAL WARMING LITIGATION UNDER THE
ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: WHAT SOSA V.
ALVAREZ MACHAIN AND ITS PROGENY




I. Introduction ........................................................................................ 155
II. The Global Warming Crisis in the Arctic ........................................... 156
III. The Alien Tort Claim s Act ................................................................ 161
IV . Sosa v. Alvarez-M achain .................................................................. 166
V. Post-Sosa Cases involving the Alien Tort Claims Act ....................... 171
A. In re: South African Apartheid Litigation ...................................... 171
B. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy ....................... 174
C. Reconciling Apartheid Litigation and Talisman ............. 176
VI. Arctic Residents' Potential Claim Under ATCA .............................. 177
VII. The Potential and Limits of the ATCA in Global Warming
L itigation ......................................................................... 182
I. Introduction
"These are things that all of our old oral history has never
mentioned," said Enosik Nashalik, 87, [an elder in the
Inuit village of Pangnirtung, Canada]. "We cannot pass on
our traditional knowledge, because it is no longer reliable.
Before, I could look at cloud patterns or the wind, or even
what stars are twinkling, and predict the weather. Now,
everything is changed."'
B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., Washington and Lee University (expected 2007). I thank
Professor Mark Drumbl of Washington and Lee University for his support and guidance.
I Doug Struck, Inuit See Signs in Arctic Thaw; String of Warm Winters Alarms 'Sentries for the
Rest of the World,' WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2006, at A01.
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Just how much has changed for inhabitants of the Arctic remains
largely unpublicized. Global warming, resulting from the accumulation of
greenhouse gases in the Earth's atmosphere, is taking its toll on the region.2
What role, if any, can law play in dealing with climate change? This Note
explores the possibility of global warming litigation under the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA). Part II begins with an overview of the global warming
crisis as it affects indigenous Arctic communities and a discussion of past
and current global warming cases. Part III introduces the ATCA and the
jurisprudence interpreting the statute before the landmark Supreme Court
case Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which is the only instance the Court has
considered the jurisdictional scope of the Act.3 Part IV describes the
Supreme Court's opinion in Sosa and what the case means for ATCA
litigants. Part V considers ATCA cases decided after Sosa and describes the
way Sosa has played out in lower courts. Part VI lays out a potential claim
for indigenous Arctic communities under the ATCA and considers whether
such a claim would be viable. Finally, Part VII discusses the role that
litigation can play in the global warming debate and whether judicializing the
issue would actually benefit the Arctic communities at risk for catastrophic
climate change.
I. The Global Warming Crisis in the Arctic
Among those communities whose lifestyles have been dramatically
altered by global warming are indigenous Arctic communities and
inhabitants of low-lying island nations. Inuit communities in the Arctic have
recently garnered media attention after the 2005-06 winter season, the
warmest winter on record in Canada and in parts of the United States.4 The
2 See generally ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, ARCTIC COUNCIL, IMPACTS OF A
WARMING ARCrIc (2004) (detailing the current and future effects of climate change on the Arctic region)
[hereinafter ACIA], available at http://amap.no/acial (cited in Mini Kaur, Global Warming and
Environmental Justice 10 (Jan. 5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)).
3 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). In Sosa, Humberto Alvarez-Machain
alleged that the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) arranged for his abduction from Mexico,
and that this constituted a violation of the law of nations under the ATCA. Id. at 698. The Court rejected
Alvarez-Machain's argument, finding that he was not entitled to a remedy under the ATCA. Id. at 697.
The Court stated that while the ATCA does allow for private rights of action, Congress intended for the
ATCA to allow jurisdiction for only a "modest set of actions." Id. at 720. The Court also found that the
applicable customary international law is the current law, not the customary international law that was in
place when Congress first enacted the ATCA. Id. at 725. The Court also stated that any alleged violation
of customary international law must also be "defined with a specificity" comparable to that of the few
offenses that were specifically recognized as violations of customary international law at the time of the
ATCA's enactment. Id. Under this framework, the Sosa Court found that Alvarez-Machain's claim fell
outside the purview of the ATCA. Id. at 712.
4 Balmy Winter Fuels Warming Fears, TORONTO SUN, Mar. 14, 2006, at 4 ("[B]etween
December and February, the country was 3.9C above normal -- the warmest winter season since
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global warming debate used to be about whether warming exists or will exist
in the future, but recent history has made that debate somewhat moot. The
debate has now shifted to whether society should be adopting policies to
reduce global warming and whether climate change has the potential to
become catastrophic.5
In the last few decades, average temperatures in the Arctic rose at
almost twice the rate of the rest of the world.6 Observed and predicted
effects of rising temperatures include receding of permafrost boundaries, tree
lines, and summer sea-ice extent.7 Indigenous Arctic communities are
experiencing both economic and cultural impacts as a result of rising
temperatures.8
In many indigenous communities, hunting is not solely for the
purpose of acquiring food or supporting one's family economically-it is
also central to the cultural and social identity of the people.9 When the loss
or migration of any particular species is threatened, the loss of indigenous
peoples' food security as well as their culture is also threatened.'0 For the
Inuit people, global warming means a disruption to their hunting and food-
sharing culture because melting sea ice causes the animals that Inuit hunt to
"decline, become less accessible, and possibly become extinct."" Some
animals at risk of extinction or severe decline include the polar bear,
different species of ice-dependent seals, migratory birds, and
caribou/reindeer. 12
Arctic animal populations are already changing.' 3 Caribou, a staple
of the Inuit diet, are falling through sea ice that was once solid. 14 Polar bears
and seals are moving northward because they need the shelter provided by
temperatures were first recorded in 1948."); Jackie Crosby, St. Paul Mayor Signs Pact to Cut Pollution,
Make City Greener; The Plan Would Cut Car and Power Plant Emissions to 1990 Levels by 2012, STAR
TRIBUNE, Feb. 2, 2006, at IA ("Minnesota's warmest winter since 1895 has melted ice sculptures,
canceled ice-fishing tournaments and prompted plenty of griping from outdoor enthusiasts unable to skate
or ski cross-country.").
5 See Juliet Eilperin, Debate on Climate Shifts to Issue of Irreparable Change; Some Experts on
Global Warming Foresee 'Tipping Point' When it is Too Late to Act, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2006, at AOl
(discussing the near-consensus among scientists that anthropogenic climate change is occurring and the
shifting of the central debate to whether climate change is occurring rapidly enough that the Earth will
reach a point of no return).
6 ACIA, supra note 2 at 1.
7 Id. at inside cover.





13 Lisa Krause, Global Warming Melts Inuit's Arctic Lifestyle, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS,
July 12, 2000, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2000/12/122900inuits.html.
14 Id.
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pack ice to give birth.'5 As species move north, new species move into their
habitat.' 6 In the Arctic this means that areas traditionally home to polar bears
are now home to grizzly bears, and fishermen farther north than ever before
are finding salmon in their nets.' 7 These changes complicate indigenous
peoples' established hunting and fishing practices.'" Those who depend on
hunting and fishing for their subsistence, and particularly those who depend
on only a few species, will experience severe impacts from changes to the
species' population or distribution.' 9
Coastal erosion and thawing permafrost are also changing lives in
many indigenous communities.20 Some coastal villages are already being
forced to relocate entirely. 2' Others are facing the risks and costs associated
with living in a community that is "eroding into the ocean right in front of
[their] eyes.
22
Climate change also presents public health concerns for many
indigenous communities.23 Effects on human health will vary based on
communities' differences in health status and adaptive abilities.24 Those that
are most vulnerable to adverse health impacts are "rural arctic residents in
small, isolated communities with a fragile system of support, little
infrastructure, and marginal or nonexistent public health systems., 25 Global
warming-induced shifts in animal populations can also increase the transport
of contaminants to the Arctic and "[facilitate].. .the spread of infectious
diseases in animals that can be transmitted to humans....26 These health
risks add to the disproportionate health hazards that Arctic communities
already face. Arctic natives are already exposed to high levels of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) because of global atmospheric patterns
that deposit the PCBs in the north.27 PCBs are "persistent bioaccumulative







19 ACIA, supra note 2.
20 Id. at8.
21 Id.
22 Id. (quoting Duane Smith, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Canada).




27 Robert D. Bullard et al., Addressing Global Poverty, Pollution, and Human Rights, in THE
QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 291 (Robert D.
Bullard ed., Sierra Club Books 2005) (cited in Mini Kaur, Global Warming and Environmental Justice 10
(Jan. 5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)).
28 Id.
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Indigenous peoples also face travel hazards due to changing ice and
weather conditions resulting from warming. 29 The time periods when ice
roads and tundra are frozen will get shorter and shorter as the warming
continues. 30 The unavailability of these critical infrastructure resources will
compromise transportation and industry on land.3'
The predicted decline in arctic sea-ice extent will also have effects
that some would find beneficial: while industry on land will be
compromised, retreating sea ice will open up new shipping routes and
prolong the time period when shipping is possible.32 Historically closed
passages may open up for industry use.33 Greater access to shipping routes,
however, will raise new questions of security and safety.34 For example, the
projected increase in shipping access may require "new and revised national
and international regulations . . . [governing] marine safety and
environmental protection. 3 5 A greater industry presence in the Arctic will
increase the risk of "environmental degradation" such as that caused by oil
spills or other industrial accidents.36 These types of incidents generally have
longer-lasting effects and confer greater harm when they occur in poor,
indigenous communities with low populations. According to the Arctic
Climate Impact Assessment, "[a] recent study suggests that the effects of oil
spills in a high-latitude, cold ocean environment last much longer and are far
worse than first suspected. 3 7 Arguments that global warming will improve
the Arctic economy fail to consider the negative impacts of warming on
every other facet of indigenous communities' lifestyles.
Arctic victims of global warming have few means to address
greenhouse gas emitters. 3  The United States comprises less than five
percent of the world's population, yet it produces twenty-five percent of
carbon dioxide emissions.3 Because carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will
29 ACIA, supra note 2 at 8.
30 Id. at9.
31 Id.
32 See id. at 12 (noting the likely increase in marine transport and access to arctic shipping routes






38 The phrase "victims of global warming" is a novel one. A Westlaw search of all cases, texts,
and periodicals revealed only six articles using the phrases "victim of global warming" or "victims of
global warming" as of March 14, 2006. I use this language throughout this Note because identifiable
victims of global warming already exist. See generally ACIA, supra note 2; see also ACF News Source,
Climate Change - Tuvalu, http://www.acfnewsource.org/environment/Tuvalu.html (discussing the
"shrinking size" of Tuvalu, a low-lying island nation in the Pacific). Arctic communities are already
feeling drastic effects of global warming and are undeniably victims of greenhouse gas emissions.
39 Jeffrey Kluger et al., Polar Ice Caps Are Melting Faster Than Ever, TIME, Apr. 3, 2006, at 28.
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remain elevated for centuries as a result of past human activities, some future
warming is unavoidable.4 Consequently, even if greenhouse gas emissions
halt immediately, global warming would continue and the lives of indigenous
people in the Arctic would continue to be altered.4'
Residents of the Arctic region are properly situated to be plaintiffs in
a global warming case: they are already experiencing concrete and severe
effects of global warming, to the extent that some communities are being
forced to relocate. Future victims of global warming will include
communities all over the world, including many who will have extreme
difficulty coping with catastrophic climate changes to their environments.
42
Those individuals in the worst position to prevent future warming or respond
to climate change will also suffer the worst consequences.
Few cases have addressed global warming, and none have
approached the topic using the ATCA. Cases seeking to address greenhouse
gas emissions have generally been unsuccessful.43 In December of 2005,
eight U.S. states, New York City, and three NGOs appealed a district court's
dismissal of their nuisance claim against the five biggest power companies in
the United States.44 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants' power plants
contribute to climate change substantially and therefore constitute a public
nuisance.45  The district court dismissed the claim on the grounds that it
lacked jurisdiction because the case presented non-justiciable political
questions that are relegated to the political branches, not to the judiciary.
46
The Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) recently filed a petition
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights claiming that the
United States' continued greenhouse gas emissions are hurting the
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 While the ATCA, discussed in Part H, infra, only addresses torts that have already occurred,
the hope is that a finding of liability under the ATCA for past harms would deter future harms by raising
the cost of producing greenhouse gas emissions.
43 For a list of cases addressing global warming that are already underway, see Climate Justice
Programme, Cases already underway, http://www.climatelaw.org/cases (cited in Mini Kaur, Global
Warming and Environmental Justice 10 (Jan. 5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)).
44 Climate Justice Programme, U.S. Nuisance Appeal, http://www.climatelaw.org/media/
U.S.%20nuisance%20appeal [hereinafter Nuisance Appeal]. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the states' complaint in Connecticut v. American Electric Power
Company, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter AEP] (cited in Mini Kaur, Global Warming
and Environmental Justice 10 (Jan. 5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)).
45 Nuisance Appeal, supra note 44.
46 AEP, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274. The court noted that President Bush expressly opposes the
Kyoto Protocol and that a non-justiciable political question exists where "[it is impossible for a court to
reach a decision] without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Id.
at 270, 272. The court concluded by reiterating the appropriate balance of power that it saw appropriate in
the global warming context: "[Cilimate change raises important foreign policy issues, and it is the
President's prerogative to address them." Id. at 273. For a discussion of how the political question
doctrine may apply to global warming litigation in the ATCA context, see Part V, infra.
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livelihoods of Arctic communities. 47 The petition demands that the United
States reduce emissions, pointing out the severe impacts of climate change
that Inuit communities are already experiencing. 4 Even if the ICC is
successful and the Commission issues a decision requiring the U.S. to adopt
49
mandatory emissions limits, the victory would only be a symbolic one.
This is because the Commission operates within the framework of the
American Convention of Human Rights, which the U.S. has not ratified.5 °
However, the ICC believes that if the Commission finds the U.S. violated
human rights, it will not be taken lightly. 51 Some speculate that a favorable
ruling could mean that the ICC could then rely on the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA), which is discussed in detail below, using the Commission's
judgment in national litigation involving the ATCA 2
III. The Alien Tort Claims Act
The First Congress enacted the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) as
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.53 The Act provides federal courts in the
United States with jurisdiction to hear cases brought by aliens alleging
violations of international law. The statute reads: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.'54 While the text of the statute does not specify the duration of the
statute of limitations, courts have adopted a ten year statute of limitations
from the Torture Victims Prevention Act (TVPA).55
47 Richard Black, Inuit Sue US Over Climate Policy, BBC News, Dec. 8, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/lhi/sci/tech/4511556.stm (cited in Mini Kaur, Global Warming and Environmental





52 Id. This approach would likely be unsuccessful because a ruling by the ICC is not customary
international law that is cognizable under the ATCA. See Part IV, infra, for a discussion of what the
Supreme Court requires for a norm to be actionable under ATCA.
53 Judiciary Act of 1789, codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). ATCA is alternatively
referred to as the Alien Tort Statute.
54 Id.
55 Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2002) (borrowing TVPA's statute of
limitations for the ATCA because the two statutes share similar goals and similar mechanisms for
achieving those goals); In re World War H Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160,
1180-81 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (concluding that the TVPA is the closest federal statute to the ATCA and
consequently borrowing the TVPA's limitations period). Congress enacted the TVPA in 1991 as a
statutory note to the ATCA. Torture Victim Prevention Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, note 2 (2000).
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ATCA was rarely applied before the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980.56 Filartiga revived the
ATCA by holding that the Act grants jurisdiction to aliens seeking redress in
United States district courts for human rights violations that occurred
overseas. 57  Filartiga opened the door for future human rights litigation
under the ATCA and created the potential for substantive rights under what
was previously viewed as a purely jurisdictional statute.58
There are three elements of a claim under the ATCA: (1) the
plaintiff must be an alien suing (2) for a tort (3) that violates the law of
nations. The third element is the most relevant to this discussion because it
presents the greatest obstacle for climate change litigants. The ability to
litigate a global warming complaint successfully under the ATCA mandates
some finding of a violation of the "law of nations," which necessitates some
positive human right that protects against environmental degradation, habitat
loss, or detriment to human health.
Laws of nations, or customary international laws, are generally
described as those that are universally accepted by States "out of a sense of
legal obligation and mutual concern., 59  Customary international law only
addresses wrongs that are of "mutual" concern to the States, those wrongs
that affect the relationship between states or between an individual and a
foreign state.6° It does not address wrongs that are of "several" concern to
56 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In Filartiga, the court considered whether
a grant of subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA was appropriate where a Paraguayan citizen
brought suit in the United States against another Paraguayan citizen, alleging violations of customary
international law that took place in Paraguay. Id. at 879-80. The plaintiffs argued the defendant tortured
and killed a member of their family in retaliation for political activities of the victim's father. Id. at 878.
The court discussed various sources of customary international law that demonstrate the law of nations
clearly and unambiguously prohibits torture. Id. at 880-85. Because the ATCA opened the "federal
courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international law," a grant of jurisdiction under
the ATCA was proper. Id. at 887. To see a discussion of cases where ATCA claims were unsuccessfully
raised before Filartiga, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article 111, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.
587, 588 (2002).
57 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (explaining that "[a]lthough the Alien Tort Statute has rarely
been the basis for jurisdiction during its long history . . . there can be little doubt that this action is
properly brought in federal court").
58 See Igor Fuks, Note, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of ATCA Litigation: Examining
Bonded Labor Claims and Corporate Liability, 106 CoLUM. L. REv. 112, 113 (2006) ("Filartiga was
revolutionary... [it] created an opening for analogous actions in the future, such as for plaintiffs seeking
redress for incidents of torture, extrajudicial killings, and state-sponsored violence against defendants
either residing or traveling in the United States.").
59 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003). The Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law defines customary international law as resulting "from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987).
60 Flores, 414 F.3d at 249.
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the States, that are matters in which States are "separately and independently
interested."' The States must also intend to be legally bound by the laws.62
ATCA liability is not limited to state actors; it can also extend to
private individuals acting under the color of the state.63 While directly
violating customary international law will certainly give rise to ATCA
jurisdiction (provided that the plaintiff is an alien alleging a tort), at least one
court has held that aiding or abetting in the violation of customary
international law also gives rise to a claim under the statute.
64
To date, only a handful of cases have approached ATCA from an
environmental perspective, and none have approached it from an
environmental human rights perspective to deal with the problem of climate
change.
In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., a group of Peruvian
plaintiffs brought personal injury claims under the ATCA against the
Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC), a United States company.65 The
plaintiffs, which included residents of Peru and the representatives of
deceased residents, alleged that SPCC's copper mining, refining, and
smelting operations created pollution that caused plaintiffs' and the
decedents' lung diseases.66 Plaintiffs argued that SPCC deprived them of
their rights to life, health, and sustainable development.67 Plaintiffs proposed
that a standard of "shockingly egregious" be applied to determine whether
their claims were recognizable under international law.
68
The court conceded that customary international law "does not stem
from any single, definitive, readily-identifiable source" and is therefore
"subject to creative interpretation., 69 For a norm to qualify as customary
international law, States must universally accept it and accede to it out of




63 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995) (cited in Laura A. Cisneros, Note, Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain - Restricting Access to U.S. Courts Under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Alien
Tort Statute: Reversing the Trend, 6 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 81, 89 (2004).
64 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 374 F. Supp. 2d. 331, 337-41
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the
imposition of aiding and abetting liability under international law).
65 Flores, 414 F.3d at 236.
66 Id. at 237.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 253.
69 Id. at 248.
70 Id. at 248-49. The mutuality requirement essentially means that a customary international law
must "[affect] the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and [be] used
by those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se." Id. at 249 (emphasis in original)
(internal citation omitted in original) (quoting UT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)).
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Looking to the charter of the International Court of Justice, the court
listed various sources of customary international law:
[T]he proper primary evidence consists only of those
"conventions" (that is, treaties) that set forth "rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states," ...
"international custom" insofar as it provides "evidence of
a general practice accepted as law," ... and "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations," ...
[A]cceptable secondary (or "subsidiary") sources
summarizing 'customary international law include
"judicial decisions," and the works of "the most highly
qualified publicists," as that term would have been
understood at the time of the Statute's drafting.7'
The court pointed out that customs based on social or moral norms
are not appropriate sources of customary international law.72 The plaintiffs'
"egregiousness" standard was rejected because it did not mandate the
universality and mutuality that customary international law requires.73 The
court also rejected plaintiffs claims that customary international law
recognized a "right to life" or a "right to health. 7 4 These claims were far too
indefinite and vague to comprise customary international law.75
The court declined to find that customary international law prohibits
intranational pollution.76 While the plaintiffs supplied the court with, inter
alia, treaties, covenants, decisions of multinational tribunals, and non-
binding declarations of the United Nations General Assembly, the court
found none of these convincing.77 None of the evidence plaintiffs provided
met the requirements of universality, obligation, and mutuality.
In Beanal v. Freeport-Morain, Indonesian plaintiffs sued two
Delaware corporations that engaged in mining operations in Irian Jaya,
Indonesia.78 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in environmental
abuses, human rights violations, and cultural genocide during the course of
their mining activities in plaintiffs' habitat.79 Arguing that Freeport' s mining
Mutuality connotes that the law, if violated, may be "capable of impairing international peace and
security." Id.
71 Id. at 251 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
72 Id. at 252.
73 Id. at 253-54.
74 Id. at 255.
75 Id.
76 Id.
'n ld. at 256.
78 Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999).
7 Id.
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operations caused harm and injury to their habitat, and that this destruction of
their habitat and religious symbols forced them to relocate, plaintiffs brought
suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act.80 The District Court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, and the case arrived on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.8m
The Fifth Circuit examined the sources on which Beanal relied for
the proposition that environmental abuse was a violation of customary
international law and found that these sources were not adequate.82 The
ATCA only applies to "shockingly egregious violations of universally
recognized principles of international law. 8 3 The agreements and treaties
that Beanal relied upon were not universally accepted in the international
community. 84 The court found that the various sources of international law
that plaintiffs set forth demonstrated a "general sense of environmental
responsibility and [stated] abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable
or discernable standards ... to identify practices that constitute international
environmental abuses or torts. 85 The court urged that federal courts should
exercise extreme caution when facing environmental claims under
international law.8 6  It urged other courts to ensure that "environmental
policies of the United States do not displace environmental policies of other
governments. ,
87
The court then turned to the cultural genocide claim. Plaintiffs
asserted that Freeport "purposely engaged in activity to destroy [their]
cultural and social framework," and that this constituted cultural genocide in
violation of the law of nations.88 The court found that plaintiffs' complaint
was filled with "conclusory allegations devoid of any underlying facts" to
support the claim of genocide. 9 Plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate that
cultural genocide constitutes a violation of the law of nations.9° It was
simply too "amorphous a cause of action" to be cognizable as a violation of
customary international law.91 Consequently, the court dismissed Beanal's
genocide claims as well.
80 Id. Plaintiffs also argued that Freeport's private security forces acted with the Republic of
Indonesia in violating international human rights, but only the environmental claims are examined here.
Id.
SI Id. (citing Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997)).
82 Id. at 167.







89 Id. at 168.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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Another court faced environmental claims in In re Agent Orange
Product Liability Litigation.92 In Agent Orange, Vietnamese nationals filed
suit against chemical companies that manufactured the herbicide Agent
Orange (dioxin) for the Vietnam War. 93 The plaintiffs alleged a host of
domestic and international law violations, including violation of the ATCA.94
Plaintiffs relied on the 1925 Geneva Protocol's prohibition of lethal gas
weapons as evidence of customary international law.95 The court rejected
this argument because at the time of the Vietnam War, the United States was
not a party to the protocol and it was therefore simply a rule based on
reciprocity, not on customary international law.96 Moreover, the Geneva
Protocol did not even encompass military use of herbicides.97 Plaintiffs also
attempted to rely on international environmental law norms, but the court
found no "international convention or instrument that solely and specifically
addresses environmental law relevant to the legality of herbicide use during
war up to 1975. 98  The court ultimately rejected and dismissed all of
plaintiffs' claims.
99
IV. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court addressed the Alien Tort
Claims Act in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.l°° Sosa was not the first instance
that the Court was presented with an ATCA claim, but it was the first time
that the Court substantively considered such a claim.'0 ' Sosa involved a
dispute between two Mexican nationals, Humberto Alvarez-Machain and
Jose Fransisco Sosa, but the underlying conflict was between Alvarez-
Machain and the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). In 1985,
a Drug Enforcement Association (DEA) official on assignment in Mexico
was captured, tortured and murdered. 0 2 DEA officials in the United States
suspected Alvarez-Machain, a physician, of being present during the torture
and prolonging the DEA agent's life to allow the torture to continue. 0 3 In
92 In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
93 Id. at 15.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 120.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 127.
99 Id. at 145.
100 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
101 See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989)
(dismissing ATCA claim because defendant was a foreign sovereign protected by the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act).
102 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697.
103 Id.
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1990, a federal grand jury indicted Alvarez for the torture and murder of the
DEA agent, and the district court issued a warrant for his arrest.' 4 The
Mexican government was unhelpful to the DEA in getting Alvarez to the
United States so that he could be arrested. 0 5 The DEA thus approved a plan
to hire a group of Mexican nationals, including Sosa, to abduct Alvarez and
bring him to the United States. °6
The plan was executed and Sosa and others brought Alvarez-
Machain to the United States, where he was arrested by federal officers.
0 7
Alvarez-Machain was tried and acquitted in 1992.108 Upon returning to
Mexico, Alvarez-Machain initiated a civil action alleging that the DEA
arranged for his abduction from Mexico, and that this constituted false arrest
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and a violation of the law of
nations under the ATCA109
Reversing the Ninth Circuit's judgment in favor of Alvarez-
Machain, the Supreme Court held that Alvarez-Machain was not entitled to a
remedy under either statute." 0 In a unanimous decision, the Court found that
Alvarez-Machain's claim did not fall within the purview of the ATCA." I
While the Sosa decision itself was unanimous, the different opinions set forth
in the case reflect diverse views of the ATCA and the role federal courts
should play in interpreting the statute.
In deciding Sosa, the Court established several important principles.
First, while the ATCA is a jurisdictional statute, it allows for private rights of
action. 12 Examining the history of the ATCA, the Court concluded that the
First Congress did not intend for the ATCA to be a "jurisdictional
convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state
legislature that might, some day, authorize the creation of causes of action or
itself decide to make some element of the law of nations actionable for the
benefit of foreigners."'" 3  Instead, they recognized certain offenses to be
104 ld. at 697-98.
1o5 ld. at 698.
106 Id.
107 Id. Prior to the trial on the merits, Alvarez-Machain moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing
that his seizure was illegal in violation of the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. Id.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss the indictment and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that a forced seizure does not affect the jurisdiction of a federal court.
Id. Sosa's case then proceeded to trial. Id. The Supreme Court's opinion on the jurisdictional issue is
located at United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
108 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 697. This Note will solely discuss the ATCA claim.
I Id. at 712.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 719.
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criminal under the law of nations, and they wanted the statute to have
practical effect in being able to address those offenses.
a14
Second, the Court found that Congress intended for the ATCA to
allow jurisdiction for "a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of
the law of nations." 15 Thus the range of rights protected by the ATCA is
limited to rights recognized by customary international law. The Court
relied on Blackstone's Commentaries for the proposition that "'offences
against this law [of nations] are principally incident to whole states or
nations,' and not individuals seeking relief in court.
' 1 6
Finally, the applicable customary international law is the current
law, not the customary international law that was in place when the First
Congress promulgated the ATCA in 1789.17 Any alleged violation of
customary international law must also be "defined with a specificity"
comparable to that of the few offenses that were specifically recognized as
violations of the law of nations when the ATCA was enacted." 8 The right
should also be clearly defined and universally accepted among civilized
nations. "19
The Court cited various cases for the proposition that any proper
claim under the ATCA would assert a right that is truly specific in definition,
universal in nature, and obligatory upon all civilized nations.2 The Court
relied on the Second Circuit's opinion in Filartiga for the proposition that
"[f]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become--like the pirate and
slave trader before him--hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."'
2 1
The Court turned to the D.C. Circuit for the principle that "the 'limits of
section 1350's reach' [should] be defined by 'a handful of heinous actions--
each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms."",122 The
Court referred to the Ninth Circuit for the phrase "specific, universal, and
obligatory" to describe actionable violations of international law. 23 These
are not environmental cases, but an environmental case under the ATCA
would have to meet similar requirements. Applying these principles to
Sosa's case, the Court concluded that "a single illegal detention of less than a
day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
114 Id.
15 Id. at 720.
116 Id. at 720 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 68).
117 Id. at 725.
Us Id.
19 Id. at 732.
120 Id.
121 Id. (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890).
122 Id. (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
123 Id. (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.
1994)).
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arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined
as to support the creation of a federal remedy." 124
The Court acknowledged that there is some element of judgment
involved on the part of courts deciding whether to grant a cause of action
under ATCA in any particular case.125  In addition to the requirements
described above, those courts should also consider the practical implications
of allowing jurisdiction under the ATCA.126  The Court advised judicial
restraint, asserting that courts should read the class of rights protected by
ATCA narrowly. 27 Lower courts should not readily expand interpretations
of customary international law according to the dictates of common law. 1
28
Justice Scalia, in a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas, argued that while the Court's analysis of the ATCA as
purely jurisdictional was correct, the Court should not have recognized any
discretionary right of the federal courts to allow claims that violate
international norms under ATCA. 129 Any recognition of international law at
the time of ATCA's enactment was that of a "general common law." 130 But
the application of a general common law was explicitly rejected by the Court
in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, which held that "all law was
grounded in a particular sovereign, either the federal or state government." 131
Justice Scalia highlighted what he perceived to be a critical distinction
between pre-Erie general common law and post-Erie federal common law. 
32
Post-Erie federal common law is made by federal courts that have been
given the authority to shape it, and that authority does not automatically flow
from a simple grant of jurisdiction.133 Because such authority does not exist
in the area of international human rights law, Justice Scalia concluded that
124 Id. at 738.
125 See id. at 732-33 (recognizing that the Court must determine whether the norm violated is
definite enough to support a cause of action under the ATCA).
126 See id. ("[Determining] whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action
should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the practical consequences of
making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts.").
127 See id. at 725-29 (discussing various reasons for courts to use judicial caution when
considering the kinds of individual claims that may fall under the ATCA).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring).
130 Id.
131 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain "The Door Is Still Ajar" For Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L.
REv. 533, 547-48 (2005) (examining Justice Scalia's absolutist argument that no general common law can
be is recognizable post-Erie). In Erie, the Court considered whether federal or state substantive law
applied to a diversity case involving a negligence action by an individual against a railroad company. Id.
at 69-71. The Court found that because there is no such thing as a federal general common law, the law to
be applied by federal courts in diversity cases is the law of the state where the court is situated. Id. at 78.
132 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745.
133 ld. at 741-42.
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the Court should not have recognized discretionary authority to create federal
common law using the ATCA.
134
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, set forth one additional
consideration for courts that are deciding whether to allow a claim under the
ATCA: the principle of international comity. 135 In Justice Breyer's view,
courts should inquire into whether the exercise of jurisdiction under the
ATCA is "consistent with those notions of comity that lead each nation to
respect the sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the reach of its laws
and their enforcement."'136 ATCA litigation should not "undermine the very
harmony [between the nations of the world] that it was intended to
promote."'137 Comity concerns should also be stronger where the conduct at
issue did not take place in the country providing the right of action, or the
individuals bringing the action are not nationals of the country.
138
Sosa is both a blessing and a curse for environmental rights
advocates. On the one hand, the case makes clear that the ATCA does allow
for a private right of action. This is important for potential plaintiffs since
potential defendants that are state actors can escape liability due to sovereign
immunity under the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act. The Court also, by
holding that the applicable law is the current customary international law
instead of the law in 1789, left open the possibility that any customary
international law could develop over time, provided that the States do in fact
agree and the law is definable and specific enough. Sosa made clear that the
law of nations is not static. It is based on concrete evidence of the behavior
of international sovereignties, which changes over time. Sosa has been
criticized for holding that the ATCA is a jurisdictional statute whose
jurisdictional reach is constantly shifting.
On the other hand, the Sosa court emphasized that customary
international law was to be construed extremely narrowly.' 39 Courts should
look to "legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority over
substantive law."'140 The Court rejected Alvarez' proposed rule as being an
134 Id. at 750 ("[The Court ignores its own conclusion that the ATS provides only jurisdiction,
wags a finger at the lower courts for going too far, and then--repeating the same formula the ambitious
lower courts themselves have used--invites them to try again.").
135 Id. at 761 (Breyer, J., concurring).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. ("These comity concerns normally do not arise (or at least are mitigated) if the conduct in
question takes place in the country that provides the cause of action or if that conduct involves that
country's own national... [tihey do arise, however, when foreign persons injured abroad bring suit in the
United States under the [ATCA], asking the courts to recognize a claim that a certain kind of foreign
conduct violates an international norm.").
139 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725-29 (discussing various reasons courts should exercise judicial caution
when considering whether claims may fall under the ATCA).
140 Id. at 726.
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"aspiration" that in the "present, imperfect" world would not rise to the level
of an customary international law.
14 1
V. Post-Sosa Cases involving the Alien Tort Claims Act
In deciding Sosa, the Supreme Court left many questions regarding
the interpretation of ATCA unanswered. 42  Subsequent lower court
decisions have not filled the gaps that Sosa left in the ATCA analytical
framework. In particular, two post-Sosa district court cases, In re: South
African Apartheid Litigation and Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, both suggest that Sosa did not clarify the scope of claims that
properly allow for jurisdiction under the ATCA.1
43
A. In re: South African Apartheid Litigation
In the Apartheid Litigation case, former victims of apartheid sued
various multinational corporations alleging that the corporations violated the
ATCA by engaging in business with South Africa's apartheid government
44
The defendant corporations moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. 145  Although the court found that "[p]laintiffs ...alleged a
veritable cornucopia of international law violations, including forced labor,
genocide, torture, sexual assault, unlawful detention, extrajudicial killings,
war crimes, and racial discrimination," it ultimately granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 146  The court
reasoned that it had to apply the law instead of its own moral ideals to the
facts of the case. 147 Examining the plaintiffs' ATCA claims, the court found
141 Id. at 738.
142 See Charles H. Whitebread, The Rule of Law, Judicial Self-Restraint, and Unanswered
Questions: Decisions of the United States Supreme Court's 2003-2004 Term, 26 WHITFIER L. REV. 101,
103 (2004) ("[T]he Court left open important questions by issuing only a narrow holding."); see also Beth
Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain "The Door Is Still Ajar" For Human Rights Litigation in
U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 535 (2005) ([T]he Supreme Court reconciled the intent of the late-
eighteenth-century drafters of the statute with the jurisprudential demands of our modem judicial
system ... [but] Sosa left several contentious issues unresolved.").
143 In re: South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18399 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
44 Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp 2d at 542.
145 Id. at 543.
146 Id. at 548, 554.
147 Id. at 548.
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that defendants did not act under the color of state action simply by doing
business with the South African Government.
1 48
The Apartheid Litigation plaintiffs also argued that even if
defendants did not act under color of state action, their aiding or abetting
international law violations or simply doing business in apartheid South
Africa constituted violations of the law of nations. 149 Addressing the aiding
and abetting argument first, the court found that plaintiffs presented little
evidence that aiding and abetting international law violations is a universally
accepted international law violation in itself.150 The court stated that ATCA
refers to international law for the causes of action over which it grants
jurisdiction to potential plaintiffs, but it does not authorize aider and abettor
liability. 5 1 Keeping Sosa's mandate of judicial deference in mind, the court
refused to write aider and abettor liability into the statute through plaintiffs'
suggested interpretation.152  The court relied heavily on Sosa for the
proposition that "deference to Congress and a restrained understanding of
new international norms was required of the lower federal courts."
53
Turning to the question of whether doing business with the South
African government constituted a violation of the law of nations, the court
examined various international treaties plaintiffs presented as evidence of
this claim. 54 The court found that neither the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide Convention") 155 nor
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment ("Convention Against Torture") 156 apply to private
actors. 157 Although both of those conventions punish complicity in acts that
violate international law, they are both concerned with criminal actions and
neither convention is self-executing. 158  Since there is no private liability
under these treaties in the United States, any alleged violation of the treaties
cannot provide a ground for jurisdiction under the ATCA.159  The court
relied on Sosa again to reject plaintiffs' arguments concerning international
148 Id. at 549 ("At most, by engaging in business with the South African regime, defendants
benefited from the unlawful state action of the apartheid government.").
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 550.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 550 n.12. Justice Scalia's concurrence, discussed above, envisioned minimal
discretionary authority in the Federal Judiciary.
154 Id. at 551.
155 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, S.
EXEC. DOC. 0, 81-1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
156 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.




conventions and United Nations' General Assembly's non-binding
resolutions, reasoning that these did not rise to the level of customary
international law mandated by Sosa.
6°
The Apartheid Litigation court also placed emphasis on another of
Sosa's admonitions: that courts beware of the possible repercussions of
finding a new international law violation that supports ATCA jurisdiction. 16'
The court described various potential collateral consequences of allowing the
apartheid victims' claim to go forward under the ATCA. 162 Since the South
African government issued a statement stating it did not support the
litigation, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed under the ATCA could preempt
the South African government's ability to handle domestic matters.163 The
United States government also issued a statement arguing that the
adjudication of the apartheid victims' suit under the ATCA would create
tension between the United States and South Africa and would frustrate the
policy of "encouraging positive change in developing countries via economic
investment. ' 64 As a result, another consequence of allowing the plaintiffs'
claim to go forward would be to discourage investment in the South African
economy. 165 In the end, the potentially "significant, if not disastrous" effects
on international commerce that could result from the court's granting ATCA
jurisdiction were simply too great for the court to ignore, especially given
Sosa's clear statement that courts should give weight to foreign relations
consequences in such cases. 1
66
160 See id. at 553 ("Even if this Court were swayed by the non-binding General Assembly
resolutions calling for an end to defendants' business activities in South Africa, it is clear from history and
from the factors announced by the Court in Sosa ... that the opinions expressed by these resolutions never






'66 Id. at 553-54. The footnote that the Apartheid Litigation case relied on for this part of its
ATCA analysis, footnote 21 of the Sosa opinion, has proven to be contentious. The footnote contains the
cryptic statement that in cases such as Apartheid Litigation, which the Sosa court explicitly referred to in
the footnote, "there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the Executive
Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign policy." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733, n.21. But the Sosa court
failed to elucidate what aspects of Apartheid Litigation called for this sort of "case-specific deference to
the political branches." Id. This footnote is particularly relevant in the global warming context since the
current administration would likely oppose any global warming litigation in U.S. courts. For a more
detailed discussion of the possible repercussions of this "obtuse" footnote, see Stephens, supra note 131,
at 560-67.
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B. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy
In Talisman, a group of current and former residents of the Sudan
brought an action under the ATCA against Talisman Energy and the
Republic of Sudan. 16 7  The plaintiffs alleged that they were victims of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and other violations of international law
perpetrated by the defendants.1 68  They argued that Talisman Energy, a
Canadian energy company, knowingly assisted the Sudan in carrying out a
campaign of genocide and other crimes against humanity. 169 Talisman
moved for judgment on the pleadings under the international comity and the
political question doctrines, urging the court to avoid interfering with the
executive and legislative branches' managing of foreign affairs.
170
Talisman sought to liken the plaintiffs' claims to those in Apartheid
Litigation, arguing that allowing a claim under the ATCA would lead to
similar foreign relations problems as those the Apartheid Litigation court
sought to avoid.171 The Canadian government issued a statement in Talisman
discouraging jurisdiction under the ATCA. 172  The statement from the
Embassy of Canada asserted that exercising jurisdiction would infringe upon
the Government of Canada's conduct of foreign relations and interfere with
its efforts to use trade as "both a stick and a carrot in support of peace" in the
Sudan. 173  The United States also issued a statement in support of the
Canadian position, arguing that "when the government in question protests
that the U.S. proceeding interferes with the conduct of its foreign policy in
pursuit of goals that the United States shares, . . . considerations of
international comity and judicial abstention may properly come into play." 74
The Talisman court rejected the analogy to Apartheid Litigation,
finding the cases to be qualitatively different. 175 Whereas the plaintiffs in
167 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, No. 01 Civ. 9882, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18399, 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
168 Id. at 2.
169 Id. at 18.
170 Id. at 2. A nonjusticiable political question traditionally involves one or more of the following:
"[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question." Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
171 Talisman, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18399, at 16-17.
172 id. at 5.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 8.
175 Id. at 18-19.
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Apartheid Litigation simply alleged that defendant multinational
corporations engaged in business in and with South Africa, the Talisman
plaintiffs alleged that Talisman Energy knowingly assisted Sudan in
perpetrating violations of customary international law. 176 The court found
the recommended amount of deference to the Government of Canada's
foreign policy unviable where the importance of the relevant foreign policy
to Canada did not outweigh the public's interest in "vindicating the values
advanced by the lawsuit."' 77 The court pointed out that the case did not
involve trade, but instead involved a Canadian company operating in the
Sudan. 178 The plaintiffs' allegations did not concern trading activity, but
instead concerned genocide and crimes against humanity.1 79  The
Government of Canada's argument that granting jurisdiction would interfere
with Canada's use of trade incentives for Sudan to strive towards peace was
thus rejected as insufficiently related to the claims being addressed in the
litigation. 80 The court also declined to grant international comity because
while Canadian courts could hear cases on the same subject matter as
Talisman, such cases would be treated as alleging violations of Canadian
rather than international law. '81
The court left open the possibility of declining to hear some cases
that interfere with a State's foreign policy. 82 Specifically, the court adopted
a two prong test to determine when a case that hinders a peace-oriented
foreign policy should be adjudicated. First, the nexus between the lawsuit
and the foreign policy must be clear. 183 Second, the foreign policy must be
"important" enough to outweigh the public interest in vindicating
fundamental rights. 84 Applying this test to the facts of Talisman, the court
concluded that the rights plaintiffs sought to protect were vital enough to
justify ATCA jurisdiction. 85 This remained true even though the court gave
"substantial deference" to the Government of Canada's position.186
Talisman Energy also argued that footnote 21 of Sosa required the
court to avoid interfering with executive and legislative discretion to manage
176 Id.
177 ld. at 25.
178 Id. at 21.
179 Id.
"8 See id. at 21-22 ("[D]eference is appropriate to the extent that a sovereign's opinion has been
stated with particularity . .. [wihile there is no requirement that a government's letter must support its
position with detailed argument, where the contents of the letter suggest a lack of understanding about the
nature of the claims in the ATS litigation, a court may take that into account in assessing the concerns
expressed in the letter." (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004))).
11 Id. at 26.
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foreign policy towards Sudan and Canada. 187 The court referred to the
footnote as dicta discussing the "'policy of case-specific deference to the
political branches' in the context of pending ATS case addressing the South
African apartheid regime."' 188 In the South African cases, the United States
and South African governments issued statements asserting that U.S.
lawsuits against corporations that conducted business in apartheid South
Africa interfere with the policies of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. 89 The Commission had categorically approached apartheid
crimes under principles of "reconciliation, reconstruction, reparation, and
goodwill." 190 The Supreme Court recognized that deference to the Executive
Branch was appropriate for such a case. 19 ' The Talisman court pointed out
that neither the Canadian nor the United States Governments contended that
the Talisman case would affect United States foreign policy towards either
Sudan or Canada. 92 Moreover, Talisman Energy never argued that the
United States made a political decision to address human rights violations in
Sudan by employing an approach such as the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission's.193 Talisman could not pinpoint any United
States foreign policies towards Sudan with which the litigation conflicted,
and was forced to "speculate... generally about its effects on efforts to
promote peace in Sudan." 194 Ultimately, all of Talisman's arguments failed
and the court rejected its motion for judgment on the pleadings.
95
C. Reconciling Apartheid Litigation and Talisman
Although Apartheid Litigation and Talisman were issued by the
same district court and addressed similar alleged offenses, the court reached
opposite decisions on the issue of ATCA jurisdiction. Was the difference
simply that the Supreme Court explicitly referred to Apartheid Litigation in
the context of the political question doctrine, as an example of a case where
discretion could be granted to the executive? The defendants in Apartheid
Litigation were doing business with the South African apartheid regime,
whereas the defendant in Talisman knowingly assisted the Sudan in
committing violations of customary international law. If this is the best way
to distinguish the two cases, that is a good sign for potential global warming
187 1d at 28-29 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21).
188 Id. at 29.
189 Id.
190 Id. (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 29-30.




litigants. Corporations producing greenhouse gas emissions know of the
externalities generated by their operations, and they are aware of the role of
these emissions in contributing to climate change.
The Talisman court recognized a distinction between past, egregious
activities that the lawsuit sought to address and future foreign policy. The
defendants wanted the court to decline to exercise jurisdiction for past events
because that exercise of jurisdiction could potentially conflict with future
foreign policy. The court was unwilling to do this in cases involving
allegations of serious violations of customary international law. Apartheid
Litigation, on the other hand, involved the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, which was already operating at the time of the
lawsuit. So instead of conflicting with future, potential foreign policy, the
court's involvement could interfere with current, ongoing policy decisions.
Applying this foreign policy discussion to the global warming
context, the United States does not have a strong policy framework in place
to deal with global warming. However, it can be argued that the failure to
establish a strong global warming policy is a policy choice in itself. A
court's involvement in the global warming context could therefore
potentially be seen as the same type of interference with current and ongoing
policy decisions that the Apartheid Litigation court wanted to avoid.
VI. Arctic Residents' Potential Claim Under ATCA
Arctic residents wishing to bring a global warming-related lawsuit
against American corporations under the ATCA would have to meet the
requirements laid out in Sosa. A potential claim would have to show that
global warming-related harm infringes on some right that is protected by
customary international law. The right at issue would have to be sufficiently
well-defined, universal and obligatory in nature, and arise out of mutual
relations between States.
Many Arctic victims of global warming reside in the United States
and would not qualify as aliens within the purview of ATCA. For
indigenous communities like the Inuit, with homelands in Alaska, Canada,
Greenland and northern Russia, 196 only those communities comprised of
aliens could bring an action under the statute. Potential defendants in the
lawsuit would be United States or foreign corporations, who are major
contributors to greenhouse gas emissions. Defendants could also include
corporations who would be vicariously liable under theories of secondary
liability such as conspiracy and aiding and abetting.
197
196 Struck, supra note 1.
197 Talisman, 374 F. Supp. 2d. at 333.
13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2006)
In order to show a violation of customary international law, potential
plaintiffs would have to point to a norm that is "definable, universal and
obligatory."'198 One approach is to argue that international law recognizes the
right to an inhabitable environment as a fundamental human right. In order
for such a right to be cognizable under the ATCA, plaintiffs would have to
rely on sources of customary international law such as those mentioned by
the Flores court: conventions setting forth rules recognized by the states
involved in the dispute, international custom, and to a lesser extent judicial
decisions and academic works.' 99
Plaintiffs could in fact point to several of the types of sources
mentioned in Flores. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights has several references to the right to a healthy environment. 200 This
includes sections "applicable to the right to a healthy environment" and
sections "focusing on the right to standard of living, housing, food, and free
development of peoples.,,201  The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights also recognizes rights to "an adequate standard of
living, . . . to health.... [and] to dispose of one's natural resources.
2 °2
International law also recognizes indigenous communities' right to
have their environment free from harm caused by others.203 The Stockholm
Declaration, which was adopted by the Stockholm Convention in 1972,
stated that nations have "the sovereign right to exploit their own natural
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. ',204  The 1992 Rio Declaration, which was
adopted by 176 nations, including the United States, contains similar
principles.20 5  The Rio Declaration adopted the portion of the Stockholm
198 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781).
199 Flores, 414 F.3d at 251.
2M See Rosemary Reed, Comment: Rising Seas and Disappearing Islands: Can Island Inhabitants
Seek Redress Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 399, 413-14 (2002) (discussing,
pre-Sosa, a potential ATCA claim for inhabitants of low-lying island nations).
201 Id. at 413 (citing United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A,
arts. 3, 22, 25, 28, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)).
202 Id. (citing International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
arts. 1, 7, 11, 12, 15, U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966). While this covenant was signed by President Jimmy
Carter in 1977, Congress has not yet ratified it and so the United States is not a party to it.
203 Id. at 414 (arguing that international law recognizes a "general duty not to damage the
environment, particularly the environment of others").
2W Id. at 414-15 (citing Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, Jun. 16, 1972, 11 LL.M. 289).
205 Id. at 415 (citing United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/REV.1 (1992)).
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Declaration quoted above, adding that that states have the affirmative right to
develop their own environmental and development policies.2 °6
One hundred and forty-one nations, not including the United States,
have ratified the Kyoto treaty, which sets caps for each nation on greenhouse
gas emissions based on a five percent reduction of 1990 levels of those
emissions.2 °7 The Montreal Protocol, first enacted in 1987 and revisited
several times since, seeks to reduce the production of ozone-depleting
substances such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). °8 Its ultimate goal is to
protect the ozone layer by phasing out the use of these substances entirely.2°
To that end, it seeks to employ "scientific knowledge, taking into account
technical and economic considerations and bearing in mind the
developmental needs of developing countries., 2 °10 Arctic plaintiffs trying to
establish a right to a healthy environment could try to use the almost-
universal approval of these agreements among civilized nations and the
universal approval of greenhouse gas reduction policies (even by the Bush
Administration) to argue an international recognition of global warming as a
harm. There is some support for the argument that U.S. actions and
statements regarding the Rio Convention and the Kyoto Treaty could give
rise to ATCA liability in the future.211  For example, a plaintiff could
potentially argue under the ATCA that the United States government has
"'acknowledged' the basis for their claims., 212
Turning to judicial opinions, plaintiffs would not have difficultly
locating opinions alluding to a right to a healthy environment. Judicial
opinions recognizing such a right have come out of courts in the Philippines,
Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru,213 and India. The complexity of the
environmental legal and regulatory framework in the United States evidences
a governmental recognition of the importance of a clean and healthy
206 Id.
207 Kluger, supra note 39; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,
1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38 [hereinafter Kyoto].
205 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S 3, available at http://hq.unep.org/ozone/Montreal-Protocol/Montreal-
Protocol2000.shtml.
209 Id. at preamble.
220 Id. The relationship between ozone depletion and global warming does not gamer but
attention, but the two are functionally related. CFCs, the ozone-depleting substances that the Montreal
Protocol seeks to reduce, trap heat and are estimated to be responsible for less than a tenth of total
warming. Union of Concerned Scientists, Global Warming FAQ, available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science/global-warming-faq.html#8. While eliminating CFCs
alone cannot solve the climate change problem, it can certainly play a part. Id.
211 Christopher C. Homer, The Perils of "Soft" and Unratified Treaty Commitments: The
Emerging Campaign to "Enforce" U.S. Acknowledgements Made In and Under the Rio Treaty and Kyoto
Protocol Using the Vienna Convention, WTO, Alien Tort Statute, and NEPA 7 (Competitive Enterprise
Institute, Working Paper, 2003), available at http://www.cei.org/pdf/3297.pdf.
222 Id. at 26.
213 Reed, supra note 200 at 416.
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environment. Arctic victims of global warming could bring a lawsuit
alleging a right to a healthy environment based on these international and
domestic sources. Whether courts would easily recognize such a claim as
sufficiently universal, specific, and mutual in nature to satisfy the
requirements of ATCA is another matter.
Potentially plaintiffs in an ATCA suit would have to overcome the
political question doctrine. In Connecticut v. American Electric Power
Company, discussed in Part II, the court dismissed a global warming
nuisance claim brought by eight states against the five largest power
companies in the United States. 14 The court found that the case presented
non-justiciable political questions and, although AEP was not an ATCA case,
its holding has implications for future ATCA cases relating to global
warming. After AEP, it will be difficult for potential plaintiffs to
overcome the political question doctrine.2 16 If other courts respond similarly,
the Bush Administration's pro-industry policies will be given deference over
the claims of the plaintiffs. Unlike the claims asserted in Talisman, claims
asserted in global warming litigation would not be likely to involve rights
courts view as "serious." A reviewing court would thus be more likely to
grant deference to the executive branch's decision to face global warming
with policy and research initiatives that lack teeth.
Global warming litigation in particular presents problems that other
claims raised under the ATCA do not present. The difficulty of proving
standing or pinpointing causation to particular defendants may be
insurmountable for plaintiffs with scarce resources. Defendants are likely to
217
challenge the plaintiffs' standing to sue in any global warming litigation.
Article HII's standing requirements must be met in any federal case, and this
includes cases brought pursuant to the ATCA. Courts have interpreted the
'injury in fact' element of standing to mean a particularized, concrete harm.
This creates problems in the global warming context because harm can often
be impeliding and not yet have completely materialized. Since many
individuals or groups that will be affected by global warming will only be
affected in the "indefinite future," defendants argue that these potential
plaintiffs lack standing.218 One court described standing in a global warming
214 AEP, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 For a discussion of Article IM standing requirements put forth by the Supreme Court and how
they may be applied to global warming cases, see Bradford Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is
Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL L. 1 (2005).
218 See Robert Meltz, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Global Warming: The
Litigation Heats Up 18 (Jan. 10, 2005) (discussing various types of problems that arise with regards to
standing in global warming litigation) (cited in Mini Kaur, Global Warming and Environmental Justice 10
(Jan. 5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)).
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lawsuit as "too general, too unsubstantiated, too unlikely to be caused by
defendant's conduct, and/or too unlikely to be redressed by the relief
sought.
219
According to the World Health Organization, climate change already
causes 150,000 deaths a year. 220  But these deaths, although concrete
instances of harm, are difficult to causally relate to global warming in
litigation, and so the causation element of standing also becomes an obstacle
to effective litigation. The link between any individual source of greenhouse
gas emissions and the harm caused by those emissions is difficult to
establish. Since greenhouse gases are a global problem, any single source, or
even a group of what may seem to be major sources, most likely represents
only a tiny part of the overall gases emitted into the atmosphere. There are
also many confounding factors present, such as feedback from greenhouse
gases that are already in the atmosphere.
Multiple commentators have compared climate change litigation
with tobacco litigation. 22' In both types of litigation, plaintiffs face
defendants with vastly greater financial resources.222 This leaves defendants
with the ability "to challenge everything, including issues like general
causation that appear to be well-established. '223 With defendants challenging
everything from harm to causation to standing to sue, plaintiffs are placed at
a severe disadvantage. Global warming plaintiffs would in fact have to
overcome many obstacles, but as commentator put it, "plaintiffs in tobacco
cases surmounted similar hurdles about a decade ago.,
224
Sosa made clear that courts should not recognize violations of
customary international law routinely, but rather reserve this right for those
egregious acts that violate fundamental and universal norms. Where nations
have been slow to respond to and acknowledge global warming, it will be
difficult, especially post-Sosa, for plaintiffs to show that customary
international law protects the right to a healthy environment. Arctic
residents' claims to a healthy environment would probably not be recognized
under the ATCA today, since some of the key players in the global warming
crisis refuse to enter any binding, obligatory agreements regarding emissions
219 Id. (quoting Center for Biological Diversity v. Abraham, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (N.D. Cal.
2002)).
220 Lei Du, Climate change 'to hit health in poor nations hardest', Science and Development
Network, Nov. 17, 2005,
http://www.scidev.net/News/index.cfm?fuseaction=readNews&itemid=2482&language=1.
221 David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (2003); J. Kevin Healy and Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change:
It's Not Just a Policy Issue for Corporate Counsel - it's a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89, 102
(2004).
222 Grossman, supra note 221 at 6.
223 Id.
224 Healy and Tapick, supra note 221 at 102.
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reductions.225 On the other hand, most of the world's civilized nations have
now acknowledged the presence of anthropogenic climate change. Even if
Arctic plaintiffs' ATCA claim is dismissed because customary international
law does not yet recognize the right to a healthy environment, such a right
will develop in the long run, as more and more nations form treaties and
issue legal decisions addressing global warming Potential plaintiffs must
keep in mind that the law in the area of climate change is continually
evolving and will always be evolving. Additionally, as discussed below,
litigation can be an effective tool even when unsuccessful.
VII. The Potential and Limits of the ATCA in Global Warming Litigation
There remains debate on whether taking legal action is an
appropriate way to approach harms resulting from global warming.226 The
general expansion of ATCA jurisdiction in Filartiga and later decisions is
also not without its share of critics, who see global warming as an issue
warranting a political instead of a legal response.
Critics argue that broadening the reach of ATCA could have several
negative consequences.228 First, ATCA decisions can conflict with decisions
of other sovereignties, especially where both parties to a lawsuit are citizens
of the same foreign state.229 Second, ATCA cases may endanger relations
between the United States and foreign governments, particularly where
"foreign-based [multinational corporations] are subjected to large, American-
style damage awards., 230  Third, because ATCA cases are civil actions,
critics believe they will evolve into "attorney-driven enrichment machines"
not unlike mass tort actions. 231 Finally, critics argue that ATCA cases do
225 See Eilperin, supra note 5 (discussing different policy approaches towards global warming).
John Marburger IM, President Bush's chief science adviser, described the Bush administration's approach
to global warming: "[T]hough everyone agrees carbon dioxide emissions should decline, the United States
prefers to promote cleaner technology rather than impose mandatory greenhouse gas limits...'The U.S. is
the world leader in doing something on climate change because of its actions on changing technology."'
Id. See also Kluger et al., supra note 39 (describing the Bush Administration's research initiatives and
voluntary emissions controls as "not exactly the laws with teeth scientists are calling for").
226 See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 221 at 6 (2003) ("Although a tort approach to climate change
might be possible, ... some would dispute its desirability, seeing global warming as something requiring a
political rather than a legal solution."); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public
Nuisance, 30 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 319 (2005) (discussing arguments that the international nature of
the global warming crisis requires a diplomatic solution rather than a legal one, and litigation in this area
could undermine "efforts by the federal government to forge a diplomatic solution to global warming").
227 See generally Gary C. Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, Institute for International
Economics, Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789 (2003).





away with well-established separation of powers principles that demand that
the executive manage foreign relations.232
Critics of climate change litigation assert that court intervention in
the global warming arena may hinder or deter legislative action, and court
rulings favoring environmentalists may be seen as attempts by activist judges
to step into the shoes of legislators. These critics also emphasize the many
alternatives to litigation. Some argue that environmentalists would be better
served by lobbying legislatures, who have the power to set concrete
standards on allowable levels of warming. Others would endorse an
approach where environmentalists focus their efforts on swaying public
opinion in their favor, which in turn would reflect in the public voting for
environmentally-friendly legislators or pushing for legislative reform.
Critics also point to the problem of redressability. No remedy can
reverse the damage already caused by warming or stop the inevitable
warming yet to occur as a result of greenhouse gases already emitted into the
atmosphere. Remedies may also be difficult to enforce. For example,
certain types of specific performance, such as injunctions ordering polluters
to cease, are expensive to enforce because their effective enforcement
requires constant monitoring of emissions. But these complications do not
retract from the underlying symbolic value of a judicially-sanctioned remedy
in the global warming context. The problems posed by standing and
causation discussed above may also make it more difficult to succeed in
climate change litigation, but that does not mean that inaction is the answer.
It is true that even successful litigation might not help the victims of
global warming. Enforcement of a favorable ruling could be difficult and
expensive, also discussed above, due to the complications involved in
measuring precise amounts of emissions. A favorable ruling for indigenous
Arctic communities would not be able to rewind the clock and reinstate their
habitat to its natural state. But there is value in filing a claim outside of
simply the potential for winning the case. A major potential benefit of
litigation is the publicity factor - even a failed lawsuit would garner a
significant amount of attention to the plight of indigenous Arctic peoples
from the media and from the public as a whole. By allowing violations of
modem-day customary international law to be filed under the ATCA, Sosa
paved the way for the public education and expressive functions of the legal
process to take place. Lawsuits that seek to break new ground, such as the
one this Note proposes, can promote political change and educate the public
even if they are unsuccessful in the courtroom. The value of litigation to
stimulate legislative activity should not be underestimated.
232 Id.
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As nations of the world globalize, both socially and economically, it
makes more and more sense for the United States to make extraterritorial
harms accountable under the ATCA. This has been argued to be especially
true in the terrorism context, where multinational corporations can
potentially "act as fronts for terrorist organizations" or "engage in activities
that can...be classified as some permutation of terrorist activity. ',233 Because
of the transnational nature of global warming, it is different from any other
type of environmental hazard. No single nation will cause the entirety of the
harm, and no single nation will feel the brunt of the harm. Sosa made clear
that ATCA specifically addresses transnational harm.2 34 This could prove to
be a strong motivator for ATCA jurisdiction in climate change cases in the
future. Those who suffer most severely from the effects of global warming
must be allowed to bring transnational claims in order to gain redress
because attempts to control greenhouse gas emissions intranationally have
proved to be fruitless.
The challenges facing indigenous communities in pursuing climate
change litigation are many, but litigation is nonetheless a valuable tool in this
context, and far superior to inaction altogether. Ultimately, the most
effective solution would likely involve a combination of these approaches
depending on the receptiveness of the legislature and the public.
233 Fuks, supra note 58 at 139-40.
2-4 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
